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NO ENTITLEMENT TO HAVE 
LAWYER PRESENT DURING 
INVESTIGATION 
R. v. Lisi, 2001 BCCA 514 
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The [Crown] says that when the conversation is looked at 
in the context of all the evidence it is clear that the 
[accused] was not making a second request for counsel, but 
rather was requesting that counsel come down to the 
police station. The [accused] had already spoken with a 
lawyer, he indicated that he understood the charge of 
refusal and knew what he was doing, and what he wanted 
was for everyone (himself, the lawyer and the police) to sit 
down and go over everything. This was not a request to 
V
Ointersection on a green light and 
fatally hit a pedestrian. Although he 
knew he had hit a person, the 
ccused drove approximately 7 minutes to his home 
hile he called his wife on his cell-phone and asked for 
er advice. His wife called 911 and advised the police of 
hat occurred.  Upon arriving home the accused 
onsumed a substantial amount of alcohol. The police 
rrived at the accused’s home and arrested him. The 
ccused was transported to the police station, provided 
ccess to a telephone, and spoke with a legal aid lawyer 
or 9 minutes. When requested to provide breath 
amples the accused refused, stating he was doing so on 
he advice of his counsel. Upon further requests to 
rovide a sample, the accused continued to refuse. When 
uestioned by the breathalyzer operator whether he 
nderstood what he was doing by refusing, the accused 
ndicated he knew what he was doing and that he had 
btained legal advice but suggested he would like to sit 
own with his lawyer and the police and “go over 
verything”. The trial judge was satisfied the accused 
as not asserting his right to counsel a second time: 
He had contacted counsel and received advice. He was thus 
given the opportunity to have meaningful contact with and 
advice from counsel. At no time did he indicate he was 
dissatisfied or displeased with the advice or indicate that he 
required further clarification. … After his first meaningful 
contact with counsel, at no time did he clearly indicate he 
wished a further opportunity to speak with counsel. 
n appeal to the BCCA, the accused (among other 
rounds) argued his right to counsel had been violated 
ecause he had asserted his right to counsel a second 
ime and should have been provided a further 
pportunity to speak with counsel. In dismissing the 
ppeal, the BCCA agreed with Crown where it stated in 
ts factum: 
speak to counsel again, but rather a request for the lawyer 
to come to down to the police detachment and be present 
during the investigation. Consequently, since the [accused] 
was not entitled to have counsel present during the 
questioning, [the breathalyzer operator] was not obliged to 
cease questioning the [accused] in face of such a request. 
(emphasis added) 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca. 
 
SUICIDE: SAFETY AND 
PREVENTION ARE TOP 
PRIORITIES 
Part 3 of 6 
Mr. Richard Dolman 
 
The following notes are from an Internet website 
under development at the Justice Institute of BC to 
assist police in handling a psychiatric crisis and to 
promote wider understanding of mental illness. The 
project was initiated by the BC Association of Chiefs 
of Police Mental Health Committee, and supported by a 
multi-agency group. Funding is from the Ministry of 
Health Services and the Justice Institute. Comments 
and suggestions to the author are welcome at: 
almond@direct.ca 
Suicide has many causes. Attempted suicide or threat 
of suicide is a frequent component of police emergency 
calls. The suicide impulse can be weak or strong. A 
subject may seem calm and rational or appear to be 
manipulative or there may be a relatively low-risk cry 
for help – which accidentally goes too far. Suicide may 
be partly a rational decision but is mainly compelled by 
depression or by psychosis with command 
hallucinations. Depression, in turn, can be intensified by 
long-term disabling effects of mental illness, by 
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 substance abuse or stress, or by bottled-up anger, 
resentment or trauma. Because of these variables, 
suicidal impulses and actions are unpredictable and 
must not be ignored. Everyone including the police need 
to take suicide warnings seriously.  
Legal action on suicide risk. Can police apprehend 
under s.28 of the MHA for apparent attempts or 
serious threats of suicide or serious self-harm? Yes. 
Such behaviour is likely to be caused by a mental 
disorder that requires treatment - which can only be 
confirmed or negated by a physician. Also, such 
behaviour needs s.28 intervention when it is likely to 
endanger; and is not an appropriate reaction to the 
environment (compared with seeking treatment or 
other help).  
Safety. Obviously this includes subject safety, i.e. 
preventing the occurrence of a premature death by 
separating the subject from a knife or other weapon or 
potential weapon, or from an instrument of harm such 
as pills or poison; and not leaving the person alone until 
medical professionals take custody. For a bridge 
jumper or person locked in a room, an ERT negotiator 
can help. In high-risk situations, safety concerns can 
also include safety of interveners (get help, plan for an 
escape route); and third-party safety. Agitated 
friends/relatives should step aside. Police can offer to 
arrange for them to be helped by a social worker 
and/or grief counselor1.  A calm and trusted friend or 
relative can provide collateral information, introduce 
police to the suicidal person, and remain in attendance 
if the situation is safe. 
Safety of the suicidal person includes more than 
protection from physical harm. It includes reduction of 
anxiety and mental pain.  In a crisis intervention, when 
police approach, the suicidal person is probably 
hypersensitive to anyone’s tone of voice and body 
language, and needs to feel non-threatened as well as 
getting offers of help. Sudden appearance of police – 
especially in uniform – can be frightening. If possible, 
have yourself introduced by a trusted relative or 
friend of the subject. Use a friendly first name 
approach.  (See Part Four in next issue for detailed 
suggestions on what to say.) 
Prevention. An important challenge for police and 
others in the front line is to help prevent relapse and 
to reduce the immediate impulses of a suicidal mental 
state. How? By making sure that intervention provides 
a positive first step toward medical treatment. 
Collateral information can be very important here 
(from family, friends, a suicide note).  It can help 
police to understand the subject’s state of mind, to be 
more sympathetic, and to talk about getting help. 
Promise to speak to relatives/friends in attendance 
about problems. Get a commitment from them to 
address a specific and painful problem. Promise medical 
attention.  
                                                 
1 Victim services, trauma and grief counseling: During business hours, 
the BC Ministry of Attorney General operates a province-wide referral 
service at: 1-800 563-0808. A federal website operated by the 
Canadian Directory of Victim Services lists victim services at many BC 
locations, at:  http://www.vaonline.org/prov_bc.html 
Reduce the pain. Usually part of the person wants to 
die; but another part wants to live: that part of the 
person needs to hear kind and caring words. If a 
subject is fairly rational, ask what are the most 
troublesome problems. Do not belittle them. That’s not 
the issue. It’s how badly the problems are hurting the 
person, whose ability to compensate and cope is 
temporarily impaired or lost. Do what you can by 
providing emotional first aid to reduce that pain. Be 
constructive about life in general. Do not raise false or 
unrealistic hopes but convey your belief that problems 
can be solved.  
Suicide by police weapons. One of the most 
challenging and dangerous situations for police can lead 
to tragedy. The media call it "suicide by cop." It’s also 
called “victim-precipitated homicide.”  Disturbed or 
distraught and suicidal individuals with some kind of 
weapon induce law enforcement personnel to kill them. 
They deliberately create a pressurized situation so 
dangerous that police are forced to shoot in self-
defence. Marksmanship at the arm or leg of a moving, 
threatening target is not a viable option. When there is 
no alternative but shooting at close range, police are 
trained to aim at the middle of the chest. In such 
cases police need alternatives including less-lethal 
weapons.  
Alternative means of force.  A subject is armed, 
intoxicated, psychotic, suicidal, does not respond to 
rational conversation, and is hidden from police view. 
What to do? Pepper spray is seldom a good option in a 
psychiatric crisis. It may be possible for police to gain 
control by: backing off, giving the subject time and 
space to calm down; using an ERT negotiator and 
telephone; or if use of force is unavoidable, using a hi-
tech Taser (stun gun) or Arwen gun (rubber or plastic 
bullets) which can briefly disable the subject to permit 
restraint. 
Volume 1 Issue 10 
October 2001 
2
 Post-trauma Stress. A suicidal crisis does not usually 
present a direct danger to interveners, but a 
completed or nearly completed suicide is highly 
stressful and traumatic to everyone involved. Family, 
children, friends, as well as police may be traumatized. 
All may need therapy, no matter how “tough” or 
“indifferent” they appear. Stress and trauma overload 
can lead to flashbacks, denial, survivor’s guilt, and more 
serious consequences if left untreated. Post-traumatic 
therapies include stress debriefing, and group 
discussion of how survivors felt about the incident at 
the time and how they feel about it now. Some people 
heal their grief and trauma by undertaking a related 
project, joining a support group and sharing with 
others in similar circumstances. 
DETENTION UNLAWFUL: 
OFFICER LACKS ARTICULABLE 
CAUSE 
R. v. Leminski, 2001 BCPC 121 
 
Police received a radio dispatch of a 
robbery in progress at a large retail 
for the stop (and thus an arbitrary detention), the 
resulting search that led to the discovery of the 
evidence was a s. 8 Charter violation. The evidence was 
thus excluded and the accused acquitted. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca. 
 
PROTECTING PRIVACY:THE 
PURPOSE OF S.8 CHARTER 
Sgt. Mike Novakowski 
 
Canadian jurisprudence has recognized 
the underlying purpose of s.8 is "to 
secure the citizen's right to a 
reasonable expectation of privacy 
against government encroachments2". This privacy 
guarantee may be expressed in two ways. It can be 
expressed as a freedom from 'unreasonable' search 
and seizure, or alternatively, as an entitlement to a 
'reasonable' expectation of privacy3.  
 
Privacy, in the Constitutional context, relates to 
privacy interests of persons, not of places4. For 
example, s. 8 would not protect an unoccupied public 
washroom stall. However, if a person were to occupy mall. Police responded and the 
description transmitted by the 
dispatcher was a 40-year-old 
Caucasian male, short brown hair, 
wearing an orange jacket, and leaving the bank carrying 
a black garbage bag containing the money taken from 
the robbery. A police officer spotted the accused, 
stopped him for investigation, and searched him and his 
backpack which lead to weapons and drug charges. In 
determining whether the police were justified in 
conducting an “investigative stop”, the court 
recognized the officer requires “a reasonable suspicion 
of crime involving the suspect” (articulable cause); not 
a “credibility based probability of crime” (reasonable 
grounds). The officer agreed  “the only unique feature 
attributable to [the accused], who was Caucasian male 
with short hair, [was] that he was wearing an orange 
jacket”. The Court noted that the accused was (and 
looked) 20 years old  (not the 40 years as reported), 
was traveling in the opposite direction the suspect was 
reported to be traveling, and was carrying nothing (the 
suspect was reported to be carrying a garbage bag). 
The Court found the Crown failed to demonstrate that 
the officer objectively had an articulable cause to stop 
the accused and therefore the detention was not 
justified. Since the officer lacked proper justification 
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 reasonable expectation of privacy and be afforded 
ome protection by s.85. Similarly, a person who enters 
 public telephone booth and closes the door is entitled 
o assume the conversation will be kept private and 
ree from interception by the state. In both cases, the 
tate intrusion encompasses a particularized place, 
owever the privacy interest of the person and the 
rotection of s.8 is triggered because of the 
ndividual’s presence and reasonable expectation of 
rivacy in that place.  
n R. v. Edwards (1996) 1 S.C.R. 128 (S.C.C.), the police 
onducted a search of the accused's girlfriend’s 
partment for drugs.  The Court found the accused's 
ights under s.8 had not been violated because he could 
ot demonstrate, on the balance of probabilities, that he 
ad a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
irlfriend's apartment. The court found the accused, 
ho was not present in the apartment, was nothing more 
                                                
 R. v. Dyment [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417 (S.C.C.). 
 Hunter v. Southam Inc. (1984), 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.) at p.108. 
 See Hunter v. Southam Inc. (1984), 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.), 
dwards v. the Queen  (1996), 104 C.C.C. (3d) 136 (S.C.C.). 
 See R. v. Baker [1998] B.C.J. No. 1854 (B.C.S.C.), R. v. Sneed [1993] 
.C.J. No. 1067 (B.C.S.C.), R. v. LeBeau & Lofthouse (1988), 41 C.C.C. 
3d) 163 (Ont.C.A.). 
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 than a privileged guest who stayed over occasionally, 
contributed nothing to the rent or household expenses, 
and had no authority to regulate access to the premises. 
The Court emphasized that s. 8 “is a personal right and 
protects people and not places.”  The personal right to 
be secure from unreasonable search or seizure may not 
be asserted vicariously and a person may not rely on the 
violation of a third parties’ rights to benefit themselves. 
A person who is aggrieved by an unreasonable search 
through the introduction of evidence obtained from a 
search of a third parties premises or property has not 
had their personal s.8 right violated unless they 
themselves can establish a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in relation to the place searched or thing seized.  
 
Contextual Approach (Case by Case Basis) 
 
What will constitute a “reasonable” expectation of 
privacy will depend on the facts of the particular case 
and will turn on the totality of the circumstances.  The 
“reasonableness standard under s.8 of the Charter 
fluctuates with the context”6. For example, at border 
crossings the reasonable expectation of privacy is lower 
than otherwise available in a wholly domestic setting7 or 
a person subject to arrest must expect a significant loss 
of personal privacy8. In assessing whether a person has 
a reasonable expectation of privacy, many factors 
including the following will be considered9: 
 
• the person’s presence at the time of the search; 
• possession or control of the property or place; 
• ownership of the property or place; 
• historical use of the property or item; 
• the ability to regulate access, including the right 
to admit or exclude others from the place; 
• the existence of a subjective expectation of 
privacy; 
• the objective reasonableness of the subjective 
expectation.   
 
In R. v. Belnav s and Lawrence [1997] 3 S.C.R. 341, police 
stopped a vehicle for speeding in which there were 
three occupants. While running a computer check 
because the driver could not produce the required 
documents, police questioned the passenger in the rear 
of the vehicle and noted three garbage bags containing 
new clothing with price tags attached. After obtaining 
conflicting stories from the occupants regarding 
ownership of the bags, the officer searched the vehicle. 
At trial the judge found a breach of s.8 and excluded 
the evidence under s.24(2) of the Charter. On appeal, 
the Supreme Court of Canada examined whether the 
driver (Belnavis) and passenger (Lawrence) had 
established a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
vehicle. 
i
                                                 
 
                                                
6 R. v. Briggs (2001) Docket:C34813 (Ont.C.A.) 
7 R. v. Simmons [1988] 2 S.C.R. 495. 
8 R. v. Higgins & Beare (1988) 45 C.C.C. (3d) 57 (S.C.C.) 
9 R. v. Edwards (1996) 1 S.C.R. 128 (S.C.C.) 
 
With respect to the driver, the Crown conceded that 
the driver, who had the permission of the owner to be 
driving, had a reasonable expectation of privacy and 
“could advance a claim that her s.8 Charter rights were 
violated by the police”. With respect to the passenger, 
the majority of the Court found that she could not 
demonstrate on a balance of probabilities that her 
privacy with respect to the vehicle or goods was 
violated: 
 
[T]he question as to whether a passenger will have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle will depend 
upon the totality of the circumstances. All of the relevant 
facts surrounding a passenger's presence in the vehicle 
will have to be considered in order to determine whether 
the passenger had a reasonable expectation of privacy. In 
this case, although [the passenger] was present at the 
time of the search, there are few other factors which 
would suggest she had an expectation of privacy in the 
vehicle. First, her connection to the vehicle was extremely 
tenuous. She did not own the vehicle, she was merely a 
passenger in a car driven by a friend of the owner of the 
vehicle. There was no evidence that she had any control 
over the vehicle, nor that she had used it in the past or 
had any relationship with the owner or driver which would 
establish some special access to or privilege in regard to 
the vehicle. [The passenger] did not demonstrate any 
ability to regulate access to the vehicle. Finally, there was 
no evidence that she had a subjective expectation of 
privacy in the vehicle.  
PRIVACY ZONES 
 
There are essentially three privacy zones encompassed 
by s.8 of the Charter10: 
 
• personal 
• spatial 
• informational 
 
Personal 
 
Personal privacy zones involve the expectation of 
privacy in the bodily integrity of a person. The more 
serious an affront to human dignity the greater the 
 
10 R. v. Dyment [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417 per La Forest. 
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 privacy interest. When the search or seizure "relates 
to the body, rather than the home, for example, the 
standard [warranting state intrusion] is even higher 
than usual11". The more invasive the search, such as a 
body cavity search, the greater the assault on a 
person's dignity12, thus the greater the justification 
required. Personal searches may vary in degree of 
intrusiveness: 
 
• frisk or pat down searches 
• strip or skin searches 
• body cavity searches 
• bodily substance searches (biological samples/body 
tissue) 
 
However, a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
relative to their person will be assessed by the 
context. In R. v. Briggs (2001) Docket:C34813 
(Ont.C.A.) Weiller J.A. for the Ontario Court of Appeal 
wrote: 
 
The extent to which state intrusion with bodily integrity 
will be tolerated under the Charter is linked to the 
reasonable expectation of privacy that an individual has. 
There is a significant difference in the reasonable 
expectation of privacy and, hence, the protection from 
interference with bodily integrity afforded to a person 
who is a suspect but has not been charged, a person who 
has been arrested and charged, a person who has been 
convicted, and a person who is subject to a custodial 
sentence.  … A person who has been convicted … no longer 
has the benefit of the presumption of innocence.  
Persons convicted of serious crimes may be subject to 
sentences of incarceration in prison or in jail.  Such 
persons are subjected to strip searches, body cavity 
searches and constant supervision.    
Human dignity is closely aligned with an individual’s 
freedom of choice.  A person convicted of a crime has a 
lesser expectation of privacy not because that person’s 
worth as a human being is less, but because the person’s 
right to make choices about his or her life is curtailed.  
Spatial 
 
Spatial, territorial, or geographical privacy zones 
involve a person’s expectation of privacy in a place or 
surroundings such as a home, vehicle, or business. Like 
personal privacy zones, an arrest significantly reduces 
the expectation of privacy and the search of a motor 
vehicle, for example, is less an affront to a person's 
liberty, dignity, and bodily integrity than a minimally 
intrusive frisk search of a person authorized incidental 
to arrest13. 
                                                 
11  R. v. Dyment [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417 per La Forest at para.35. 
12 R. v. Debot [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140 per Lamer J. 
 
• The public has a reasonable expectation of privacy 
within the sanctity of their dwelling house, 
whether it is an apartment unit, a detached home,  
or a hotel room14. The principle that "a man's home 
is his castle" is a bulwark for the protection of the 
individual and the sanctity of the home affords the 
individual a measure of privacy and tranquility 
against the state15. There is no place where persons 
can have a greater expectation of privacy than 
within their dwelling house and the unauthorized 
presence of agents of the state in a home is the 
ultimate invasion of privacy16. Thus, when the object 
of an unreasonable search is a dwelling house, any 
violation of the Charter will be rendered all the 
more serious17. As stated by Carthy J.A. in R. v. 
Sutherland (2000) 150 C.C.C. (3d) 231 (Ont.C.A.) at 
p. 239: 
 
A search of a dwelling house must be approached with 
the degree of responsibility appropriate to an invasion 
of a place where the highest degree of privacy is 
expected. 
 
The "reasonable expectation of privacy includes 
the expectation that their personal conversations 
carried on in a "normal" tone of voice will not be 
eavesdropped upon by agents of the state18.  
Similarly, persons have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the approach to their home19. However, 
there will be occasions where the principle of 
inviolability of the home will yield to the legitimate 
requirements of law enforcement. 
 
• A person may have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in a premise other than a dwelling house 
such as a business. For example, the area of a 
business establishment open to the public would not 
be protected by s.8 of the Charter during regular 
business hours. A business "that is open to the 
public with an implied invitation to all members of 
the public to enter has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy from having a police officer enter the area 
of the premises to which the public are impliedly 
                                                 
13 Caslake v. the Queen [1998] 1 S.C.R. 51 per Bastarache J. 
14 R. v. Love (1995) 102 C.C.C. (3d) 393 (Alta. C.A.) 
15 R. v. Silveira [1995] 2 S.C.R. 297 per La Forest at para.41. 
16 R. v. Silveira [1995] 2 S.C.R. 297 per Cory J. at para. 140 and 148. 
17 R. v. Lamy (1993) 80 C.C.C. (3d)  558 (Man.C.A.)  at p.570. 
18 R. v. Sandhu (1993) 82 C.C.C. (3d) 236 (B.C.C.A.) 
19 R. v. Evans (1996) 104 C.C.C (3d) 23 (S.C.C.) 
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 invited"20. However, private or non-public areas such 
as an office in the back of the same establishment 
would be afforded some protection under the 
Charter21 .  
 
• An individual driving a vehicle 
on a public roadway, although 
having a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, has a 
reduced expectation of privacy
dwelling house or office22. Oper
highly licensed, regulated, and 
vehicles operate on public road
parked and are serviced in public
interiors are highly visible. The d
who either is the owner or has
the owner to drive it, has a reas
of privacy with respect to th
contents.  A passenger may or
reasonable expectation of priv
depending on the relevant facts
presence in the vehicle23. 
 
Informational 
 
Informational privacy zones involv
the expectation of privacy in retaine
personal information (provided 
confidence). Its use is restricted t
the purpose for which it was divulge
For example, a person who provide
personal information to a physi
purposes may have a privacy 
information. The personal medical in
necessarily be freely provided to th
Similarly, where the police unreason
blood samples, the accused maintains
in the information pertaining to thes
In considering whether a person 
expectation of privacy in informat
factors must be assessed in 
interests in protecting individual dig
autonomy with the government’s int
its goals, notably those of 
enforcement25: 
                                                 
20 R. v. Fitt (1995) 96 C.C.C. (3d) 341 affirmed (
224 (S.C.C.), R. v. Spindloe 2001 SKCA 58. 
21 R. v. Kouyas  (1994) 136 N.S.R. (2d) 195 (N.S.
22 R. v. Higgins and Higgins (1996) 111 C.C.C. (3d
p.212. 
23 R v. Belnavis (1997), 118 C.C.C. (3d) 405 (S.C.C
24 R. v. Borden (1994) 92 C.C.C. (3d) 404 (S.C.C.
25 R. v. Plant [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281 (S.C.C.) 
• the nature of the information itself, 
• the nature of the relationship between the party 
releasing the information and the party claiming its 
confidentiality, 
• the place where the information was obtained, 
• the manner in which the information was obtained, 
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• the seriousness of the crime being investigated. 
 
In R. v. Dorfer (1996) 104 C.C.C. (3d) 528 (B.C.C.A.), 
police, hoping to acquire DNA evidence from the 
accused (who was a prisoner), obtained information 
from prison officials as to the time and place where 
the accused would have dental treatment. The Court 
found the “presence of a patient is information 
classified as “neutral”” and providing such information 
would not result in a s.8 violation: 
 
Divulging such information does not, by itself, breach a 
common law duty of confidentiality to a patient.  Such 
information is not of such personal nature that a doctor or 
dentist must refuse to disclose it upon being questioned by 
a police officer in a criminal investigation. Thus, even in a 
non-prison setting there can be no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in respect to such information. 
 
In R. v. Plant [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281, police received an 
anonymous tip of a marihuana grow operation being for medical 
est in that 
ation may not 
olice by staff.  
seize hair and 
ivacy interest 
dily samples24. 
a reasonable 
the following 
cing societal 
 integrity, and 
t in advancing 
ffective law 
 103 C.C.C. (3d) 
(Que.C.A.) at 
operated at a Calgary address. Police, after confirming 
the address, conducted a computer query of the 
electrical consumption records of the suspect residence 
on a computer located at the police office that was 
linked to the utility company. Police used this 
information to support an application for a search 
warrant. In finding that the police search of the 
electrical consumption information did not infringe the 
accused’s right to privacy, the majority held: 
 
Overall, I have concluded from the nature of the 
information, the relationship between the appellant and 
the Commission, the place and manner of the search and 
the seriousness of the offence under investigation, that 
the appellant cannot be said to have held a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in relation to the computerized 
electricity records which outweighs the state interest in 
enforcing the laws relating to narcotics offences. As 
such, the appellant has failed to bring this search within 
the parameters of s. 8 of the Charter. This information 
was, therefore, available to the police to support the 
application for a search warrant.  
 
6
 COPY OF RECORDED SEXUAL 
ASSAULT NEED NOT BE 
PROVIDED TO ACCUSED 
R. v. W.A.O., 2001 SKCA 64 
 
The accused allegedly sexually 
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but the plaintiff fell and the officer slipped past him on 
the wet ground. After the plaintiff rose from the 
ground he advanced on the officer, who instructed the 
plaintiff to remain on the ground. The plaintiff did not 
comply with the officer and the officer delivered a 
baton strike to the plaintiff’s torso. A second blow that 
followed struck the plaintiff on the head. The officer 
stated that he never intended to strike the plaintiff’s 
V
Oassaulted the victim and while doing 
so recorded on videotape the assault. 
The videotape, seized by police, 
“captured the sexual acts underlying 
he charge of sexual assault”. Crown refused to provide 
 copy of the tape to the accused (citing a fear the 
ictim’s personal privacy would be further compromised) 
ut was prepared to permit a viewing of the tape by the 
ccused, his counsel, and any defence expert at the 
rown or defence counsel’s office. The accused applied 
nder s.24(1) of the Charter arguing he was entitled to a 
opy of the tape as the Crown had a duty of disclosure; 
llowing the accused to make full answer and defence to 
he charge he was facing (a right protected under s.7 of 
he Charter). In dismissing an appeal of the Court of 
ueen’s Bench ruling that Crown need not provide a copy 
o the accused, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal 
recognizing the Crown disclosed the existence and 
ontent of the tape but chose not to provide a copy) 
ound the Crown appropriately exercised its discretion 
n “protecting the privacy interests of the complainant, 
n the one hand, and of enabling the accused to examine, 
he tape on the other”. 
omplete case available at www.canlii.org. 
 
OFFICER JUSTIFIED IN 
STRIKING SUSPECT TWICE 
WITH BATON  
McNabb v. Regina (City) Police, 2001 SKQB 355 
 
After a short vehicle pursuit, the 
head and attributed the strike to the muddy terrain in 
the alley and the darkness of the area. The plaintiff fell 
to the ground and was arrested by the officer for 
impaired driving, dangerous driving and suspicion the 
vehicle may have been stolen. The judge found the 
plaintiff not to be a credible witness and accepted the 
evidence of the officer. A police expert testified he 
“had no concerns about the use of force in the manner 
described”. Barclay J. of the Saskatchewan Court of 
Queen’s Bench recognized that “a peace officer having 
the right to use force must use it reasonably and not 
negligently or else be liable for all damages for the 
negligence caused” and dismissed the plaintiff’s lawsuit. 
In this case the Court “found that [the officer] … was 
justified in arresting [the plaintiff] and that he used 
reasonable force”.  
 
DETENTION LAWFUL: ODOUR 
SEARCH REASONABLE 
R. v. Brown, 2001 SKQB 382 
 
A police officer was at his residence 
when he heard a loud noise and 
became suspicious because there had 
been many break and enters in the 
town. After leaving his residence, 
the officer stopped the only vehicle in the area which 
happened to be a van driven by a female and occupied by 
the accused passenger. While asking the driver if she 
had heard anything, the officer detected a strong odour 
of marihuana. Although denying possessing any drugs, 
the driver permitted the officer to search the van , plaintiff, who was the driver, jumped 
from his vehicle and began running 
down an alley. A police officer gave 
chase while carrying his police baton. 
 confrontation occurred and the plaintiff claimed he 
as struck approximately 31 times by the officer with 
is baton; 6 times prior to curling into the fetal position, 
0 times while in this position, and 15 times after being 
andcuffed. The defendant officer testified that he 
ttempted to strike the plaintiff’s legs with the baton 
w
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assenger side of the vehicle where he noted the odour 
f marihuana intensified. The officer requested the 
ccused to exit the vehicle and to search her pockets. 
he accused appeared nervous and the officer observed 
luminum paper in her lower right leg pocket of her army 
ants.  
n dismissing the accused’s argument that she had been 
rbitrarily detained, the Court stated, at para.9: 
7
 Here the detention of the vehicle was in the course of an 
investigation. The undisputed evidence discloses that there 
had been a series of break-ins in the town… The incident 
occurred at 1:00 a.m. on Tuesday after [the officer] heard 
loud bangs. Neither the driver nor the van were familiar to 
[the officer] and it was the only vehicle in the area. In this 
case [the officer] did not randomly stop the van. He 
deliberately stopped it as he was investigating a potential 
break-in. 
 
And further, at para.12: 
 
It is critical to underscore that a police officer who stops 
a vehicle based on a reasonable suspicion is not arbitrarily 
detaining a vehicle. 
 
In finding the detention lawful, the Court addressed the 
legality of the arrest with respect to the sufficiency of 
the odour of marihuana providing reasonable grounds 
upon which to justify the arrest. In this case, the 
“strong smell of drugs gave [the officer] reasonable 
grounds to search the van, the operator and, had he 
wished to do so, the passenger”. The fact that the 
search preceded the arrest was of no consequence 
because “the decision to defer the formal arrest until 
the results of the search were known did not affect the 
reasonableness to the search itself”. The Court 
dismissed the accused’s appeal and the conviction for 
possession of cannabis resin stood. 
 
 
DRUG GROWERS SENTENCE 
INCREASED FROM 
CONDITIONAL SENTENCE TO 
INCARCERATION 
R. Tran, 2001 BCCA 503 
 
The accused was convicted of 
P
p
t
i
f
t
a
s
marihuana. The accused was sentenced to 30 days in jail 
and received a $3,000 fine for this earlier offence.  
 
In granting the Crown’s appeal, and imposing a custodial 
sentence of 2 years less a day, the Court weighed the 
favourable circumstances of the accused (married, 
employed, children, overcoming cocaine abuse) with the 
aggravating factors.  
 
…this was a second offence. The [accused] was involved as 
a principal in a very profitable illegal business. Sentences 
can be viewed as a cost of doing business and lenient 
sentences provide little deterrent compared to the profit 
potential. As well as the profit potential these operations 
create other risks including the risks of fire hazards and 
violence through the involvement of organized crime… 
 
The BCCA found the “trial judge failed to give adequate 
weight to the factor of general deterrence in the 
sentence he imposed for a second offence by a principle 
participant”. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca. 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
“Police officers have difficult duties to perform and 
must often make quick decisions but if the society in 
which we live is to maintain its peace and tranquility, 
there will be occasions when innocent citizens will be 
put to some trouble and inconvenience by the actions 
of police officers acting in good faith. This is one of 
the small prices that we must pay for our 
freedom….There are, of course, occasions when police 
officers exceed their authority and arrogate 
themselves powers and privileges which legally they do 
not have. In those situations such officers must be 
dealt with according to law26”. Sask.Crt.Q.B. Justice 
Johnson  
 
V
Ocultivation and possession of 
marihuana for the purpose of 
trafficking and given a conditional 
sentence of two years less a day. 
olice found 3,900 marihuana clones and 45 mother 
lants in a townhouse unit in which the accused was a 
enant and which was described as “a sophisticated 
ndoor marihuana growing operation known as a clone 
actory”. The accused was arrested leaving the 
ownhouse and entering a vehicle containing US$59,000 
nd CDN$22,000. The accused had also been convicted 
ix months before this arrest for cultivation of 
 
FEEDBACK WANTED 
 
 
                                                 
26 Carr v. Forbes et al. (1980) 7 Sask. R. 123 (Q.B.) at p.125. 
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at (604) 528-5733 or e-mail at 
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